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The $4 Billion Question: An Analysis
of Congressional Responses to the
FSC/ETI Dispute under WTO Export
Subsidy Standards

William Chou*
During the decade-long relationship between the United States and the
World Trade Organization (WTO), perhaps no controversy has fomented as
long and bitterly as the dispute over the U.S. tax benefits for exporters. This
article analyzes two competing bills before the House of Representatives,
both devised to bring the United States in compliance with the WTO's
ruling against the U.S. Foreign Sale Corporation (FSC) and Exterritorial
Income (ETI) tax regimes as prohibited export subsidies.' Hit with a $4
billion retaliatory tariff by the European Union, the House sought new tax
legislation that would preserve at least some of the tax benefits exporters
have enjoyed since 1971.2 One bill, proposed by Representatives Philip
*William Chou, J.D. Candidate 2005, Northwestern University School of Law.
EDITOR'S NOTE: After this article was written, Congress passed the final version of the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520.ENR 108th Cong. (2004), on Oct. 11, 2004,
and it was signed into law by President George W. Bush on Oct. 22, 2004. The provisions of
the American Jobs Creation Act are substantially similar to the versions of the Thomas Bill
analyzed in Mr. Chou's article. As such, the subsequent passage and enactment of legislation
in this area does not affect the analysis of this article.
' Bills have also been introduced in the Senate. Both Senators Charles Grassley of Iowa
and Orrin Hatch of Utah introduced bills (respectively S. 1637 108th Cong. (2003) and S.
1475 108th Cong. (2003)) to bring the United States into compliance with the WTO
FSC/ETI ruling. Subsequently, Grassley and Hatch cosponsored the Jumpstart Our Business
Strength (JOBS) Act, S. 1637 108th Cong. (2004), which was passed on May 11, 2004. This
bill was included as an amendment (S. Amdt. 3562) to the House bill, H.R. 4520 108th
Cong. (2004), which was passed on June 17, 2004. The Senate version of the bill bears many
similarities to the Crane-Rangel Bill discussed infra. The House version of the bill, also
known as the Thomas Bill, is discussed extensively in this article.
2Bill to End Subsidies to U.S. Exporters Is a Boon for Special Interests, KNIGHT
RIDDER/TRIB. Bus. NEWS WASH. BUREAU (DC), June 18, 2004, available at 2004 WL
55575077. The sanctions began in March 2004 with an additional five percent duty on
certain U.S.-exported goods, with the percentage rising by one percent each month. See EU
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Crane of Illinois and Charles Rangel of New York (Crane-Rangel Bill or
Crane-Rangel), provides tax credits for domestic manufacturers of up to ten
percent for domestic production receipts. 3 A second bill, proposed by
Representative Bill Thomas of California, focuses on providing a broader
range of tax initiatives that benefit both domestic manufacturers and
multinationals with overseas operations.4 These initiatives include greater
double-taxation relief for foreign sources of income, Alternative Minimum
Tax (AMT) relief, domestic production incentives similar to those in the
Crane-Rangel Bill, and new dividend deductions to induce companies to
reinvest foreign earnings back in the United States.
The competition between these bills did not cut neatly across party
lines; it reflected bipartisan ideological differences that pitted legislators of
the same party against one another on how the revenues from the FSC/ETI
repeal should be allocated. Not surprisingly, major corporations and
organizations have aligned on opposite sides of this issue. Caterpillar,
Boeing, Microsoft, and the AFL-CIO have lined up in support of the CraneRangel Bill. 5 On the other side, Coca-Cola, Hewlett Packard, and ExxonMobil have put their weight behind the Thomas Bill. 6 Ultimately, a second
version of Congressman Thomas's Bill (Thomas Bill) prevailed, but only
after compromise and the addition of special interest provisions to lure the
votes of key Congressmen. 7 Meanwhile, the Senate passed its own
legislation, leading the way for the formation of a conference committee to
reconcile the two bills in the fall of 2004.8
Parts I and II of this article provides a historical background of the
FSC and ETI regimes, respectively. Part III summarizes the provisions of
the Crane-Rangel Bill. Part IV discusses the relevant sections of the
Thomas Bill. Part V analyzes the Thomas Bill and determines whether its
provisions are likely to be found compliant by a dispute settlement body
under current WTO legal standards.

Hails Latest U.S. Move to End Trade Dispute, REUTERS NEWS (London), June 18, 2004,
availableat http://www.marketnewzealand.com/MNZ/news/story/4558/l0782.aspx.
3 H.R. 1769, 108th Cong. (2003).
4 H.R. 2896, 108th Cong. (2003).
5 See Juliet Eilperin, Export Tax-Break Battle Grows Intense, SEATTLE TIMEs, July 8,
2003, at D3.
6 Deirdre Shesgreen, Lawmakers, CorporationsPick Sides, Preparefor Fight on House
Trade Bill, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 26, 2004, at A4.
1 H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. (2004).
8 S. 1637, supra note 1.
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I. A HISTORY OF THE FSC TAX REGIME
A. Precursor to the FSC: the DISC
The FSC and ETI regimes trace their origin to 1971, when Congress
enacted the Domestic International Sale Corporation (DISC) tax regime to
provide tax incentives for U.S. exportation activity. 9 To qualify as a DISC,
a corporation must be incorporated within the United States,' and it must
ensure that (1) 95% or more of its gross receipts are "Qualified Export
Receipts;"'" (2) 95% of its assets are "Qualified Export Assets;" 1 2 and (3)
the cororation has only one class of stock and a minimum of $2,500 in
capital. 3 A corporation that meets the above requirements must also
formally elect to be treated as a DISC for the taxable year. 14 The purpose of
implementing the regime was to allow for the deferral of taxes on income
from exports; a DISC was able to defer income tax for up to one-half of its
foreign profits. 5 Those profits were not 6taxed unless they were distributed
to shareholders in the form of dividends.'
9 Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, S. 501, 85 Stat. 497 (1971). The DISC
legislation was, in significant part, a result of complaints by businesses over the growing
trade imbalance, as well as the impact of the anti-deferral rules imposed by subpart F (§§
951-64) of the Internal Revenue Code (2002). See Harold S. Peckron, Uniform Rules of
Engagement: The New Tax Regime for Foreign Sales, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
1,5 (2001).
10 I.R.C. § 992(a)(1) (1973).
I" Id. § 993(a). Qualified Export Receipts include gross receipts from the sale, exchange,
or other disposition of "Export Property" and gross receipts from the lease or rental of
Export Property.
12 Id § 993(b). Export Property is an example of a Qualified Export Asset. I.R.C. §
993(c)(1) (1973) defines Export Property as general property that is:
(A) manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted in the United States by a person other than
a DISC,
(B)held primarily for sale, lease, or rental, in the ordinary course of trade or business, by, or
to, a DISC, for direct use, consumption, or disposition outside the United States, and
(C) not more than 50% of the fair market value of which is attributable to articles imported
into the United States.
13Id § 992.
14 Id. § 992(b).
15See Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: the Lessons of the
DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1443, 1446 (1988).
16 As long as the profits were retained within the DISC and invested in "qualified export
assets" under I.R.C. § 993(b)(7) (1973), the profits from the DISC remained untaxed. It was
relatively easy for a U.S. manufacturer to participate in the DISC regime. For instance, many
corporations set up DISC-eligible shell entities solely for the purpose of processing sales of
export goods. Not surprisingly, the DISC regime enjoyed significant popularity. By March
of 1972, there were 1,136 DISCs, and by 1981, the number of DISCs grew to 13,796. See
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In 1973, European signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) protested that the DISC regime was an illegal subsidy under
Article XVI of the GATT. 17 Specifically, these nations argued that the
DISC tax regime in effect provided tax exemptions because a corporation
could gotentially defer tax on its export earnings indefinitely through a
DISC. In 1976, a GATT panel declared that the DISC regime constituted
an illegal subsidy scheme under the GATT Agreement.1 9 The panel found
that by examining the DISC legislation in terms of its substantive economic
consequences, as opposed to form, it was a measure "essentially related to
exports" that tended to lead to the expansion of export activity.2 ° The
United States agreed before the GATT Panel to withdraw the DISC scheme
to avoid retaliatory tariffs, and in 1983, Congress adopted the FSC regime
in its place.21

B. FSC Tax Regime
The FSC regime was implemented by the Tax Reform Act of 1984.22
Like the DISC regime, the FSC scheme afforded tax benefits to
specifically-designated entities (FSCs) that met certain qualifications.23

David L. Boren, Boren on DISC and GA TT, 16 TAx NOTES 271 (1982).
17 The European signatories alleged, inter alia, that the DISC regime violated Article
XVI:4 of GATT. This article provides that:
[C]ontracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on
the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of
such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market.
General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (GATT), art. XVI:4, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
A-51, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, 250 (amended
1962), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/.
18 GATT Panel Decision Report on DISC United States Tax Legislation, Nov. 12, 1976,
GATT B.I.S.D (23rd Supp.) T 28 (1977).
19 Id.

80.

20 Id. 67.
21 See Ronald D. Semau, The Foreign Sales Corporation Legislation: A $10 Billion
Boondoggle, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1190 (1986). The DISC regime still exists as an
incentive for small exporters, though DISCs are assessed an interest charge in order to
comply with GATT rules prohibiting the deferral of tax without interest. See Rosendo
Lopez-Mata, Income Taxation, International Competitiveness and the World Trade
Organization'sRules on Subsidies: Lessons to the U.S. and to the World from the FSC
Dispute, 54 TAx LAW. 577, 596 (2001).
22 The FSC provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494
(1984), was adopted into the Internal Revenue Code as § § 921-27 (repealed 2000).
23 See I.R.C. § 922 (1984) (repealed 2000), which defines an FSC. Like a DISC, a
company must elect to become an FSC in order to be considered as such for the taxable year.
Id. § 922(a)(2).
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However, an FSC must be established in a foreign jurisdiction or in a
possession of the United States, and it must also meet certain corporate
governance requirements so as to maintain a substantial presence in that
jurisdiction.24
In order to receive tax benefits, FSCs were also required to meet both
foreign management and economic process tests.25 To meet the foreign
management requirement, the FSC must: (1) hold all of its board of
directors and shareholders meetings outside the United States; (2) maintain
its principal bank account outside the United States for the taxable year; and
(3) disburse dividends, legal and accounting fees, and salaries of officers
and directors from bank accounts maintained outside the United States.2 6
The foreign economic process test sets forth similarly stringent standards.
An FSC met this requirement if for any transaction the FSC: (1) solicits,
negotiates, or contracts outside the United States, and (2) the foreign direct
costs attributable to such transaction constitute at least 50% of the total
direct costs of the transaction.27
Unlike the DISC regime, the FSC regime focuses its tax benefits on
certain income derived from foreign sources, as opposed to using a blanket
exemption on all the income generated by the qualified entity. 28 A portion
of an FSC's earnings from "Foreign Gross Trading Receipts," also known
as "Exempt Foreign Trade Income," was excluded from gross income, as it
was considered "foreign source income not effectively connected with
conduct of a trade or business within the United States. 29 Generally,

24

In terms of corporate governance requirements, an FSC must for the taxable year:
(i) maintain an office outside the United States... or in a possession of the United States;
(ii) maintain a permanent set of books of account (including invoices) of such corporation at
such office; and
(iii) maintain at a location within the United States the records which such corporation is
required to keep under section 6001

Id. § 922(a)(1)(D). In addition, § 922 required that the FSC not have more than twenty-five
shareholders any time during the tax year and have at least one member of the board of
directors who is not a resident of the United States.
25 Id. § 924(b)(1).
26 Id. § 924(c).
27 Id. § 924(d)(1). Alternatively, an FSC could also meet the economic process test if the
foreign direct costs attributable to at least two of the following activities related to the
transaction constitute at least 85% of the total direct costs of the transaction: (1) advertising;
(2) processing of customer orders; (3) transportation of goods from the FSC to the customer;
(4) determination and transmission of a final invoice and receipt of payment; and (5)
assumption of credit risk. I.R.C. § 924(d)(2) (1984) (repealed 2000).
28To be sure, a DISC still had to meet the 95% qualified export receipts and asset tests,
and therefore a large proportion of that entity's income would be foreign source income.
29 Id.§ 921(a).
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Exempt Foreign Trade Income is 30% of the gross income derived
from
30
each transaction attributable to Foreign Gross Trading Receipts.
Foreign Gross Trading Receipts consist of transactions involving the
sale or lease of Export Property. 3' Export Property must be property that is:
(1) manufactured or produced in the United States by a person other than an
FSC; (2) sold or leased for use, consumption, or disposition outside the
United States; (3) with no more than 50% of the property's fair market
value attributable to imports. 32 The non-exempt portion is taxable to the
FSC.33 Overall, the FSC does not depart drastically from the general DISC
framework, with the exception that the qualifying beneficiary must be
established, maintained, and governed outside the United States-an
attempt, no doubt, to make the measure appear more related to the taxation
of foreign source income.
C. The FSC Dispute
1. Substantive Law on Subsidies since GA TTXVI.4
In 1973, the GATT Council established four panels to hear disputes
concerning the legality of the DISC legislation and the income tax practices
of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.34 These disputes became
collectively known as the Tax Legislation Cases.35 In 1976, the panels
concluded that each of the these nation's practices were inconsistent with its

30 Id. § 923(a)(2). An exception to this rule is when special administrative pricing rules
apply. See infra note 31.
31Id. § 924(a)(1). Sale of Export Property sold to an FSC by a related entity (e.g.,
domestic parent corporation), or a commission paid to the FSC by such party for a

transaction involving export property, are subject to special administrative pricing rules in
order to prevent abuse by the parent and FSC such that non-arms length pricing results in
maximum tax advantage. See id. § 925. Transactions that require the application of special
administrative pricing rules are subject to a different formula to determine the amount of
income includible as Exempt Foreign Trade Income. Specifically, 15/23 of the income
attributable to Foreign Gross Trading Receipts is considered exempt from an FSC's gross
income. Id. § 923(a)(3).
12 I.R.C. § 927(a)(1984) (repealed 2000).

33 Id. § 921(a). The non-exempt portion is also known as "Foreign Trade Income,"
which includes, inter alia, all dividends, royalties, and investment income of an FSC. Id. §
921(d). Another benefit of the FSC program was the general ability of the U.S. parent to
apply a 100% dividends-received deduction for distributions from the FSC out of earnings
attributable to Foreign Trade Income. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG.,
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE TRADE DISPUTE RELATING TO THE PRIOR-LAW FOREIGN
SALES CORPORATION PROVISIONS AND THE PRESENT-LAw EXCLUSION FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL
INCOME AND A DESCRIPTION OF THESE RULES, (JCX-83-02), July 26, (2002).

34 See Rosendo Lopez-Mata, supra note 21, at 592.

" See id.
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obligations under Article XVI:4. 36 These reports and findings were
formally adopted through a Memorandum of Understanding in 1981
between the parties (1981 Understanding), though the disputing parties
agreed that there would be no formal recognition of any violation under
Article XVI:4. 3 7 A key part of the 1981 Understanding states:
The Council adopts these reports on the understanding that with respect
to these cases, and in general, economic processes (including
transactions involving exported goods) located outside the territorial
limits of the exporting country need not be subject to taxation by the
exporting country and should not be regarded as a prohibited export
subsidy (under Article XVI:4)... Furthermore, Article XVI: 4 does not
prohibit the adoption of measures to avoid double-taxation of foreign
source income.
In 1979, GATT signatories convened in Tokyo for a round of
negotiations on trade topics ranging from anti-dumping to export
subsidies. 39 These negotiations culminated in the adoption of the Tokyo
Round Codes in 1982, which were formally understood to be an agreement
on the interpretation and application of the 1947 GATT Agreement. 40
In 1994, the Uruguay Round of negotiations resulted in the formation
of another set of codes, designed to build upon the Tokyo Round Codes and
the 1947 GATT Agreement. The portion of code from the Uruguay Round
relating to export subsidies is known as the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM). 4 1 With the formation of the WTO via the
Marakesh Protocol in 1994, the SCM became formally embodied in the
WTO rules and regulations.4 2

36 Hunter R. Clark, et al., The WTO Ruling on Foreign Sales Corporations: Costliest
Battle Yet in an EscalatingTrade War Between the United States and the European Union?,
10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 291,298 (2001).
37 See Lopez-Mata, supra note 21, at 593-94.
38 Tax Legislation, BISD 28S/114 Dec. 7-8 1981, GATT B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 114
(1982). It is apparent that the United States relied heavily on this section of the 1981
Understanding in developing the FSC. For example, exempt income under the FSC was
considered "not effectively connected with the United States," in large part to characterize
this income as closely as possible to the concept of foreign source income. Moreover, the
FSC regime's economic process requirements, see supra note 27, are consistent with the
GATT Council's statement that a nation need not subject foreign economic processes to
taxation.
39 See Lopez-Mata, supra note 21, at 595.
40 See id.
41 Id. at 580-81.
42 See id.
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The European Union's Legal Arguments

As early as 1985, consultations were held between the United States

and other key economic nations, including the European Union, Japan,

Australia, and Canada over the alleged illegality of the FSC regime. 4 In
November 1997, the European Union formally requested consultations with
the United States over the FSC. 44 After conducting several rounds of
negotiations to no avail, a WTO Dispute Panel convened in July 1998 to
hear the case.4 5
The European Union first argued that the FSC regime was a subsidy
under Article 1.1 of the SCM. Article 1.1 of the SCM declares that a
"subsidy" exists if "government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or
not collected" 46 and a "benefit is thereby conferred. '' 4 7 The European Union
argued that the exemption of foreign source income from subpart F
represented income to the U.S. Treasury that would have been otherwise
due, and that clearly the result was a benefit conferred to the FSC, its
corporate parent, and affiliates.48
The European Union further argued that the FSC regime violated
Articles 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) of the SCM because it constituted prohibited
subsidies. 49 Article 3.1 (a) prohibits subsidies that "are contingent in law or
in fact upon export performance. ' 50 Article 3.1 (a) refers to Annex I of the
SCM for illustrations of proscribed export subsidies. 5' Export contingency

43WTO Dispute Panel Decision Report on U. S. Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations," WT/DS108/R (WTO) at 4.177 (Oct. 8, 1999) available at 1999 WL 973750
[hereinafter FSC Panel].
"Id.
1.1.
45id.

46 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND,

art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii), available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter SCM].
47 Id.

48 FSC Panel, supra note 43, 4.294.
49Id. 3.2. The European Union also alleged violations of Articles 9.1 (d), 10.1, and 10.3
of the Agreement on Agriculture, which is separate from the SCM.
50SCM, supranote 46, at art. 3.1(a).
51Among the types of subsidies listed under Annex I, and hence prohibited under article
3.1(a) of the SCM are "the provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an
industry contingent upon export performance", and:
The provision by governments ...either directly or indirectly through government-mandated
schemes, of imported or domestic products or services for use in the production of exported
goods, on terms or conditions more favourable than for provision of like or directly
competitive products or services for use in the production of goods for domestic
consumption, if (in the case of products) such terms or conditions are more favourable than
those commercially available on world markets to their exporters.
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may be found either in law or in fact, but a subsidy granted to exporting
corporations is alone insufficient to constitute an export subsidy.5 2
Article 3.1(b) prohibits subsidies that are contingent, "whether solely
or as one of several other conditions," upon using domestic over imported
goods. Article 1 similarly circumscribes the meaning of "subsidy" in
Article 3.1 (b). The European Union argued alternatively that the limitations
on Export Property, as defined in the Internal Revenue Code Section
927(e), put foreign manufacturers at a disadvantage vis-A-vis U.S.
manufacturers, as not more than half of the fair market value of the export
good can be attributable to imported goods in order to qualify as Export
Property.53
3.

U.S. Defenses

The United States argued as a matter of first principle that if, under
WTO rules, a nation is not obligated to tax certain categories of income,
then the exemption of such income from taxation cannot constitute a
subsidy.54 To support its contention, the United States referred to footnote
59 of Annex I of the SCM Agreement, which qualifies the list of prohibited
export subsidies and reaffirms the principle that member nations need not
tax income from foreign sources.
From this footnote the United States
argued that the "income forgone otherwise due" standard does not apply to
the collection or non-collection of56foreign source income because it was not
"otherwise due" in the first place.
The United States also argued that the 1981 Understanding represented
not only a set of agreements binding solely those parties privy to the
disputes,57 but also an authoritative interpretation of GATT Article XVI:4
which bound all GATT signatories.58 The United States referred to Article
31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, under which the
1981 Understanding qualified as a "subsequent practice," and therefore
Id. at Annex I (a) and (d).
52 Id. at art. 3.1(a)n.4.
53 FSC Panel, supra note 43,

4.180.
54 Id. 4.526.
55 SCM, supra note 51, annex I(e), n.59. Footnote 59 states that "Members recognize that
deferral need not amount to an export subsidy where, for example, appropriate interest
charges are collected" and that " [plaragraph (e) [barring deferral of taxes paid by
commercial or industrial concerns] is not intended to limit a Member from taking measures
to avoid the double-taxation of foreign-source income earned by its enterprises or the
enterprises of another Member." Id.
56 FSC Panel, supra note 43,
4.526-4.527.
7 Id. 4.379.
58 Id. 4.380. The United States argued that "the 1981 Council Decision sanctified the
differential tax treatment of foreign and domestic activities, even when those activities
involve export transactions." Id. 4.677.
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should be instrumental to the interpretation of the SCM Agreement.59
A parallel, and more general, argument advanced by the United States
was that a ruling by the WTO against the FSC regime would in essence
pass judgment on the type of taxation systems nations should adopt
indirectly, and would thus contravene a WTO-stated principle of tax system
neutrality.60 The United States alluded to the disparities that exist between
a worldwide taxation system (as implemented in the United States) and a
territorial system (adopted by most E.U. nations). In the United States'
opinion, the FSC was merely an attempt to level the playing field for all
nations to compete on substantially the same terms.
4.

The WTO Dispute Panel'sDecision

On October 8 1999, the WTO Dispute Panel dealt a blow to the United
States by ruling that the FSC was a prohibited export subsidy under 3.1 (a).
However, the Panel declined to rule on whether the FSC was also a
prohibited subsidy under Article 3.1(b).6' In reaching its result, the Panel
made several key findings of law that would be relevant for future disputes.
a. The Legal Effect of the 1981 Understanding
The WTO Dispute Panel rejected the United States' argument that the
1981 Understanding was an authoritative and binding restatement of GATT
Article XVI:4.62 Instead, the Panel found the language of the 1981
Understanding inconclusive, and it was therefore necessary to examine the
circumstances surrounding its adoption.63 The WTO Dispute Panel referred
to the GATT Council Chairman's statement that "the adoption of these
reports together with the [1981] [U]nderstanding does not affect the rights
and obligations of contracting parties under the General Agreement." 64 To
the WTO Dispute Panel, the Chairman's statement was irreconcilable with
the view that the 1981 Understanding should be binding upon WTO
members or the WTO Dispute Panel for that matter.65 For the very same
reason, it would also be inconsistent to consider the 1981 Understanding a
"subsequent practice" for purposes of the Vienna Convention on Treaties;
to hold otherwise would alter rights and obligations from the 1947 GATT
'9 Id.

4.380.

60 Id. 7.121.
61FSC Panel, supra note 43, 7.132.
62Id. 7.74. In response to the sanctification argument advanced by the United States,

supra note 58, the Dispute Panel noted that "[i]t is also striking to see the working of the
[1981 Understanding] GATT Council assimilated to those of the Vatican and its like." Id.
4.842.
63FSC Panel, supra note 43, 7.66.
6'Id. 7.68.
65 id.
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Agreement.6 6
Although the WTO Dispute Panel found that the 1981 Understanding
was a "decision" under GATT Article XVI:I, the 1981 Understanding
could not be extended so as to also become an interpretation of the SCM
agreement.67
Specifically, the WTO Dispute Panel found that the
differences between Article XVI:4 and the SCM Agreement were
sufficiently material to render the 1981 Understanding ineffective to
provide any judicial gloss on the latter.68
b. The Significance of Footnote 59
The Panel rejected the United States' argument that because footnote
59 gives nations the freedom to tax or not tax income from foreign sources,
such income could not be considered "otherwise due" for purposes of the
Article 1 definition of a subsidy. 69 The Panel first examined the structure of
the SCM Agreement, and found that though Article 1.1 should clearly not
be read in isolation and without any consideration of footnote 59, the
footnote's use should nevertheless be exercised with "considerable caution"
because it appears within an illustrative definition of a "subsidy., 70 Next,
the Panel found that when Article 1.1 is read in conjunction with footnote
59, the most one could reasonably conclude was that "a decision... not to
tax any income arising from foreign economic processes would not
represent the foregoing of revenue 'otherwise due.' 1 However, this did
not imply that member nations were free to selectively exempt some foreign
source income and not others.72
c.

Income Forgone that is Otherwise Due and Benefit Conferred

The WTO Dispute Panel's analysis then turned to whether there was
income forgone by the United States that was otherwise due. The central
question was what standard the Panel should apply to determine if there
was income actually otherwise due under a member nation's tax system.
Id. 7.75.
Id. 7.79.
68 FSC Panel, supra note 43,
7.80. The Dispute Panel found that while the SCM
Agreement concretely defines terms such as "subsidy," "export subsidy," "financial
contribution," and "otherwise due," none of these terms were explicit, much less defined, in
Article XVI4. Id.
7.80-7.81. Indeed, the establishment of specific definitions of these
terms was widely regarded as one of the more significant achievements of the formation of
the WTO. Id. 7.80. Nevertheless, the WTO Dispute Panel found that Article XVI:4 could
be used in certain instances to help interpret limited parts of the SCM Agreement. Id. 7.82.
69 FSC Panel, supra note 43, 7.92.
Id. 7.90.
71 Id. 7.92.
72 id.
66

67
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The European Union pointed to three specific tax benefits of the FSC
regime that were each an example of the forgoing of income that was
otherwise due. The first exemption was under Internal Revenue Code,
Section 921(a), which deemed Exempt FSC Foreign Trade Income as
"income which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or
business within the United States." 73 The amount of an FSC's Exempt
Foreign Trade Income is based on the percentage of the FSC's overall
foreign trade income for the taxable year. The second tax benefit raised
by the European Union was the exemption of FSC foreign trade income
from the anti-deferral rules under subpart F. 75 The third tax benefit brought
before the Panel was the ability of FSC shareholders to deduct all dividend
income received from an FSC. 76
The WTO Dispute Panel took a different view from the European
Union, but nevertheless held that these three exemptions in totality
represented an interconnected scheme to forgo revenue that was otherwise
due. In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel ruled that its role was not to
perform an exemption-by-exemption or benefit-by-benefit analysis, but
rather to assess the effects of them taken together.77 The Panel left open the
possibility that revenue may not be otherwise due when an FSC in some
cases receives less favorable treatment than under the prevailing default
scheme.78 However, the Panel found this possibility inapplicable in the
instant case because a corporation can elect FSC status every year, and thus
only miscalculation would result in an FSC being taxed on terms less
favorable than default status.79

d. Export Contingency under the FSC
The WTO Dispute Panel next turned to the question of whether the
FSC regime provided prohibited export subsidies under Article 3.1(a). The
Panel reasoned that because Exempt Foreign Trade Income requires the
sale, exchange, lease, or rental of Export Property (or services "related and

71 I.R.C. § 921(a) (repealed 2000).
14 See id. I.R.C. § 923(a) sets forth specific percentages allocable to exempt foreign
trade
income depending on whether administrative pricing rules apply. Id.§ 923(a).
71Id.§ 95 1(e) (2004). Generally, taxes on foreign-source income for foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. corporations are deferred until distributed back to the U.S. parent. However, under
Subpart F, a domestic shareholder in a controlled foreign corporation must report as part of
her gross income a pro rata share of the undistributed income of the controlled foreign
corporation. Id.§ 95 1(e).

76 I.R.C. § 245(c) (2002).

77FSC Panel, supra note 43,
78 Id. 7.101.
79 id.

7.99.
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subsidiary" thereto), 80 and because such property by definition must meet
both domestic production and foreign use/consumption requirements,81 the
benefit was in fact contingent on export performance.
The WTO Dispute Panel once again rejected the United States'
argument that footnote 59 implied that a member nation was free not to tax
income from foreign economic activity, and therefore income exempted by
the FSC measures was not "otherwise due" and by definition not an export
subsidy.83 In the view of the Panel, there was no contradiction in a rule that
allowed member states to exempt income from foreign sources, while at the
same time prohibiting tax exemptions of income from export activity.8 4 As
a result of its ruling that the FSC scheme was an illegal export subsidy, the
Dispute Panel ruled that the United States must withdraw the FSC
provisions by October 1, 2000. 8
5.The WTO Appellate Body's Decision
The Appellate Body upheld the Dispute Panel's determination that the
"income otherwise due" test was a comparison between the income under
and how that same income would be treated absent
the exemption measure
86
that exemption.

The United States asserted on appeal that the Dispute Panel erred by
not beginning its analysis under Article 3.1(a) with an examination of
footnote 59, but instead proceeded directly to the definition of a subsidy in
Article 1.1. The Appellate Body responded that whether one begins with
80 I.R.C. § 924 (repealed 2000).
81 Id. § 927(a).

82 FSC Panel, supra note 43, 7.108.
83 See id. 7.116-7.120.
4 Id. 7.119. In addition to its fundamental claim that the FSC's tax benefit's were
violative of Article 3.1(a), the European Union also argued that the administrative pricing
rules, which allocated income between the FSC and its domestic parent, independently ran
afoul of that same provision of the SCM. Id. 7.124. The Dispute Panel, however, found
that these rules were not independent from the FSC tax regime (i.e., they had no separate
existence apart from the general FSC exemption provisions). Id. 7.127. Because the Panel
had already determined that the FSC as a whole was inconsistent with Article 3.1(a), it
declined to rule on the legality of the administrative pricing rules separately. See id.
7.124-7.129.
85 FSC Panel, supra note 43, 8.8.
86 WTO Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations," WT/DS 108/AB/R (WTO) 91 (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter FSC Appellate
Body] availableat 2000 WL 234553. The Appellate Body expressed concern that such a test
would be easily circumvented in the future by "designing a tax regime under which there
would be no general rule that applied formally to the revenues in question, absent the
contested measure." Id. However, it appears that with the broad reach of Internal Revenue
Code section 61(a), it would be difficult for the United States to circumvent the "otherwise
due" standard in this manner.
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footnote 59 or Article 1.1 the outcome would be the same. 87 That footnote
59 sets forth measures that are not prohibited export subsidies does not
mean that it serves to define what a "subsidy" is for purposes of Article 1.1
of the SCM.88
The United States also contended that the Dispute Panel erred in its
finding that the 1981 Understanding was not incorporated into footnote
59.89 The Appellate Body, however, agreed with the Dispute Panel's twostep analysis; the language of the 1981 Understanding was indeed
ambiguous on whether it was intended to bind future signatories, and thus it
was appropriate to look to the circumstances surrounding the 1981
Understanding's adoption. 90 The Appellate Body concluded that the Panel
was correct in finding that the Understanding was only meant to bind the
parties privy to those negotiations, and that it cannot be incorporated into
the SCM Agreement. 9 1
A noteworthy assertion made by the United States, but ultimately
dismissed on procedural grounds, was that the FSC regime was not an
export subsidy by reason of footnote 59 because it was designed to avoid
double-taxation. 92 The Appellate Body ruled that because the issue was not
previously raised before the Dispute Panel, it did not have the mandate to
rule on that matter. 93 Despite the unfavorable ruling against the United
States in this case, it opened a new avenue of argument for future disputes,
as will be discussed below. The Appellate Body upheld
94 the Panel's
decision not to rule on the E.U.'s claims under Article 3. 1(b).
II.

A HISTORY OF THE ETI TAX REGIME
In the aftermath of the FSC dispute, the United States was left with no
recourse but to withdraw the FSC scheme, and to develop a replacement
legislative program. On November 15, 2000, President Clinton signed the
FSC Repeal and Extra-territorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000. 9" The ETI
regime managed to preserve many of the FSC scheme's benefits while at
the same time reducing some of its burdensome requirements. Although
87 FSC Appellate Body, supra note 86,
88 Id. 93.

89.

8 Id. 104.
90
Id.I 111.
91 FSC Appellate Body, supra note 86, 112.
92 Id. 101.
93 Id. The Appellate Body cited Canada-Aircraft, where they declined to rule on a new
argument because it would have required them to "solicit, receive, and review new facts."
Id.

102.
94 Id. 176.
95 FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-519,
HR 4896, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000).
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the United States proclaimed that this legislation would allay the concerns
of the European Union,96 the E.U. response was less than enthusiastic.9 7
The ETI Act creates the concept of "Extraterritorial Income. 98 Unlike
the FSC regime, a foreign entity vehicle is not necessary to obtain tax
benefits under ETI; the Extraterritorial Income of a U.S. corporation is
excludible from gross income to the extent it qualifies as "Qualifying
Foreign Trade Income." 99 Qualifying Foreign Trade Income is defined
generally as the amount of gross income for each transaction, if excluded,
that would reduce the taxable income of such transaction equal to the
greatest of: "(A) 30 percent of the foreign sale and leasing income derived
from such transaction, (B) 1.2 percent of the foreign trading gross receipts
derived by the taxpayer from the transaction, or (C) 15 percent10of
0 the
foreign trade income derived by the taxpayer from such transaction."
Extraterritorial Income is defined as the gross income of a taxpayer
attributable to "Foreign Trading Gross Receipts."'' Foreign Trading Gross
Receipts are, in turn, measured by the amount of transactions involving
"Qualifying Foreign Trade Property."' 0 2 The requirements for Qualifying
Foreign Trade Property closely track those in order to satisfy the definition
96 Statement on Signing the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of
2000, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2885 (Nov. 20, 2000). After signing the bill, President
Clinton stated, "[wie believe that this legislation specifically addresses the concerns raised
by the WTO Appellate Body and will be found to be WTO-compliant. Id.
97 See EU/US: Americans Contest EU Demandfor USD4 Billion Sanctions, EUR. REP.,
Dec. 2, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 24320190. European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy
called the ETI Act "even worse" than the FSC. Id.
" I.R.C. § 114(e) (2004).
99 See id. §§ 943(e) and 941(a). Not surprisingly, Internal Revenue Code section 114,
subsections (c) and (d) disallow foreign tax credits and deductions in connection with any
Extraterritorial Income that is excluded from gross income pursuant to Internal Revenue
Code section 114(a). Id. § 114(a), (c), (d).
'o Id. § 941(a)(1)(A)-(C). Foreign Trade Gross Receipts are defined in section 942(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Id. § 942(a); see infra note 102. Foreign Sale and Leasing
Income is defined in Internal Revenue Code section 941(c)(1). Id § 941(c)(1). Foreign
Trade Income is defined in Internal Revenue Code section 941(b)(1) as "the taxable income
of the taxpayer attributable to foreign gross trading gross receipts of the taxpayer." I.R.C. §
941(b)(1).
l''Id. § 114(e).
102 Id. § 942(a)(1). Specifically, gross receipts must be, inter alia:
(A) from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualifying foreign trade property,
(B) from the lease or rental of qualifying foreign trade property for use by the lessee outside
the United States,
(C) for services which are related and subsidiary to - (i) any sale, exchange, or other
disposition of qualifying foreign trade property, or (ii) any lease or rental of qualifying
foreign trade property described in subparagraph (B) by such taxpayer....
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of Export Property under the FSC. One significant difference however is
that Qualifying Foreign Trade Property may be manufactured within or
outside the United States. 10 3 However, Qualifying Foreign Trade Property
still must be held for sale, lease or rental, for use or consumption outside
the United States. 10 4 Like the FSC, the ETI regime requires that no more
than fifty percent of the fair market value of the property be attributable to
articles manufactured outside the United States.M Thus, although there
could still be manufacturing overseas sufficient to constitute Qualifying
Foreign Trade Property, at least some component or input to that property
must trace its origin back to the United States.
Transactions involving Qualifying Foreign Trade Property must also
meet foreign economic process requirements. This requirement is satisfied
if for each qualifying transaction, the corporation solicited, negotiated, or
contracted outside the United States, and the foreign direct costs of certain
activities meet a specific proportion of the total direct costs of the same set
of activities. 10 6 The activities calculated into direct costs include:
(A) advertising and sales promotion, (3) the processing of customer
orders and the arranging for delivery, (C) transportation outside the
United States in connection with delivery of the property to the
customer, (D) the determination and transmittal of a final invoice or the
receipt of payment, and (E) the assumption of credit risk. 0 7
A. ETI Dispute
Not long after adoption of the ETI legislation, the European Union
lodged a complaint to challenge the legality of the ETI regime.10 8 On
December 7, 2000, after a month of consultations, the European Union
requested the establishment of a Dispute Panel.10 9
The arguments advanced by the European Union were substantially
similar to those raised in the FSC Dispute: (a) the ETI regime was a subsidy
under Article 1.1; (b) the ETI regime was a prohibited subsidy under Article
3.1(a) because it was export contingent; and (c) the ETI regime was a

103

Id. § 943(a)(1)(A).

104 I.R.C. § 943(a)(1)(B) (2004).
105 I.R.C. § 943(a)(1)(C) (2002).
106
107

Id. § 942(b).
Id. § 942(b)(3).

108 WTO Report of the Panel on United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations"-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities,
WT/DS108/RW (Aug. 20, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/
WT/DS/l08RW-00.DOC through 108RW-06.DOC [hereinafter ETI Panel].
109 Id. 1.8.
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prohibited subsidy under Article 111:4 of GATT because the tax structure
1 10
favored the use of domestic manufacturing inputs over foreign ones.
The United States countered that the tax exemption under the ETI
regime was not the forgoing of income otherwise due, and the
corresponding tax benefit was not export contingent."' Even if the ETI
regime was deemed to be an export subsidy, the United States argued that
59 expressly permits
the ETI measure was not prohibited because footnote
12
measures implemented to avoid double-taxation."
1. Forgoing ofIncome Otherwise Due and Benefit is Conferred
The first part of the Panel's opinion applied the familiar "otherwise
due" test. The Panel found that extraterritorial income was essentially
carved out of income that was not shielded from taxation. 13 Although there
was nothing in the Internal Revenue Code that specified that in the absence
of the ETI Act such income would be taxable, the Panel found the language
of Internal Revenue Code Section 61(a) sufficiently broad to militate for
such a result. 1 4 Based on considerations of "the degree of conditionality
[of the measure], the range of limitations, and the manner in which the
measure at issue related to the overall regime,""' 5 the Panel had little
United States was indeed forgoing revenue that
difficulty finding that the
6
would have been due. 1
2. Export Contingency
Despite the fact that Qualifying Foreign Trade Property could be in
significant part manufactured overseas, the Panel found that fact alone
insufficient to render the regime not "export contingent.""' 7 Specifically, it
noted that a scheme need not be entirely export contingent in all its
conditions in order to be an illegal export subsidy. 1 8 The Dispute Panel
ll0 Id. 3.1. In addition, the European Union alleged that the United States failed to
comply and withdraw from the FSC regime as ordered by the Appellate Body, and thus
violated Article 4.7 of the SCM (requires members to withdraw prohibited subsidies without
delay). Id.
111Id. 3.3.
112Id.
8.76. This point was raised previously before the Appellate Body in the FSC
Dispute, but was not ruled on because the issue was not properly raised before the Dispute
Panel in that case.
113 ETI Panel, supra note 108, 8.25.
"14 I.R.C. § 61(a) states that gross income includes income from "whatever
source
derived." I.R.C. § 61(a) (2004).
115 ETI Panel, supra note 108, 8.29.
116Id. 8.30.
117Id. 8.61.
118Id. 8.64.
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cited the precedent Canada-Aircraft, where the Appellate Body ruled that
"[i]t is enough to show that one or some... contributions do constitute
subsidies 'contingent ...in fact.., upon export performance"' to render
the entire scheme illegal under Article 3.1(a). 119 The Panel noted that as
long as there is differential tax treatment between domestically-produced
goods that are sold abroad and those that are sold domestically such that the
former is more tax-advantageous than the latter, export contingency is not
eliminated. 120 Nevertheless, the ETI's apparent defect could be cured by
extending the subsidy to goods of U.S. origin that are consumed in
domestic and foreign markets. 12 1 In other words, it is the disparate
treatment between the two22consumption markets that makes ETI contingent
upon export performance. 1
3.

Double-TaxationDefense

The Panel found that although the ETI regime potentially relieved
some transactions from double-taxation, the scheme as a whole was not a
measure designed to achieve such an end, and therefore did not enjoy an
exemption under footnote 59.123 In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate
Body emphasized that the exemption need not entirely eliminate doubletaxation to fall within footnote 59.124 Nor did the Appellate Body require
that the exemptions be designed to address an actual double-taxation25
situation (i.e., exemptions could be prophylactic in purpose).
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body found several key flaws in the ETI which
in totality made footnote 59 unavailable. First, it found that the ETI was
both over and under-inclusive to be considered a double-taxation
elimination measure. It was overly broad in that it included income that
was unlikely to be taxed by another jurisdiction. 2 6 An example would be
income for a corporation that makes a sale of goods in another country
without having a permanent establishment in that jurisdiction. 27 Yet, the
Panel also left the door open by stating, "[w]e do not mean to suggest that
119ETI Panel, supra note 108, 8.64 (citing WTO Report of the Appellate Body Report
- Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R).
120 Id. 8.67.
121Id. 8.72.
122 Id.

123 Id. 8.97.

124 Id. 8.95. ("[W]e do not view footnote 59 as requiring that a measure 'to avoid' the
double-taxation of foreign-source income must avoid double-taxation entirely, exclusively or
precisely.").

125 ETI Panel, supra note 108,

126
Id. 8.98.

8.103.

127 Id. 8.102. The Panel specifically referred to the OECD Model Tax Convention,
which would tax profits of a corporation only in jurisdictions where it maintained a
permanent presence.
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the absence of a permanent establishment requirement in the Act in itself
means that the Act is not a measure to avoid double-taxation within the
meaning of footnote 59:,1I28
At the same time, the Panel found that the ETI scheme was overly
narrow in that a corporation could have a permanent establishment overseas
(and thus fall within that nation's taxing jurisdiction), but fail to meet the
exemption requirement because foreign economic process requirements
were not met, or the value of domestic inputs into the property did not meet
the 50% requirement. 129 In addition, the Panel noted that the United States
already had bilateral tax treaties with a number of nations that addressed
double-taxation. 130
B. ETI Appellate Body Ruling
In response to the Dispute Panel's adverse ruling, the United States
appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, but was once again defeated.13 ' In
arriving at its judgment, the Appellate Body made several findings13 of
2 law
that have potential precedent value for future cases before the WTO.
The first finding pertained to the "otherwise due" standard. The
Appellate Body further refined the test by ruling that what should be
examined under the default standard is "comparable income" exempted
under the measure in question. 133 Therefore, the proper category of income
that should be analyzed in the ETI dispute should be foreign-source income
and how it would be treated under other extant rules.'13 The Appellate
Body nonetheless held that because Section 61 does not differentiate
between foreign and domestic sources of income, and because a corporation
can elect to have some of its income treated as extraterritorial income,135it
followed that the United States did forgo revenue that was otherwise due.
Secondly, the Appellate Body rejected the U.S. argument that the ETI
measure was export-neutral because the tax benefit was available to those
who produce goods outside the United States. According to the United
States, the Dispute Panel inappropriately bifurcated its analysis by ruling
only on the component of the ETI regime that bestowed exemptions for
goods produced domestically. The Appellate Body responded, "[o]ur
conclusion that the ETI measure grants subsidies that are export contingent
128

Id.

8.103.

129 Id. 8.104.
130

Id. 8.105.

131
ETI Dispute Appellate Body Decision, WT/DS 108/AB/RW (WTO) (2002), available
at 2002 WL 44907 [hereinafter ETI Appellate Body].
132 Id.
133Id. 91.
114 Id.

101.
131
Id. 105.
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in the first set of circumstances is not affected by the fact that the subsidy
can also be obtained in the second set of circumstances.' ' 6
As to whether ETI was a measure designed to prevent double-taxation
of foreign income, the Appellate Body first looked to the text of footnote
59. It rejected the notion that it was for member nations to determine what
constitutes foreign source income; such an interpretation would obviate the
purposes of the prohibition on export subsidies and provide too easy of a
loophole.137 Absent a definition of foreign source income in the SCM itself,
the Appellate Body looked to bilateral treaties among nations and examined
the types of income those treaties sought to address. 138 From this
investigation, the Appellate Body concluded, "The common element is that
a "foreign" State will tax a non-resident on income which is generated
by
139
activities of the non-resident that have some link with that State."'
From this conclusion, the Appellate Body found that although a
measure need not be entirely precise, the ETI regime systematically
misallocated income between foreign and domestic sources of income and
thus could not be reasonably deemed as a double-taxation prevention
scheme within the meaning of footnote 59.140 It found particularly
problematic Section 942(b)(4), also known as a "deeming provision."
Under this rule, "[a] taxpayer shall be treated as meeting the requirements
of this subsection with respect to any sales transaction involving any
property if any related person has met such requirements in such transaction
or any other sales transaction involving such property.''
The Appellate Body used the example of a transaction between a
domestic manufacturer and a domestic distributor. 42 For this transaction,
none of the profit is deemed to qualify as exempt territorial income.
However, if the distributor in turn sells some the same product to foreign
purchaser, then the deeming provision becomes effective and integrates the
two transactions as one, thus qualifying a proportion of the total profits as
extraterritorial income. To the Appellate Body, the result creates a
disproportionate benefit between the first and second transactions relative to
the actual amount of foreign source income. 143
136 Id. 119.
137 ETI Appellate Body, supra note 131,
138

Id. 141.

"9 Id.

140 Id.

140.

143.

166.
141I.R.C. § 942(b)(4) (2002).
142 ETI Appellate Body, supra note 131,
157-66. The Appellate Body presented a
sample transaction assuming that a domestic corporation elects to use a 1.2% or 15%
exemption from the qualifying foreign trading income. The 30% exemption option, in
contrast, distinguishes between foreign source and domestic source income. See I.R.C. §
941(a)(1) (2002).
143 ETI Appellate Body, supra note 131, 161.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Body struck down the ETI
regime and ordered that the United States remove the legislation or
otherwise face a $4 billion retaliatory tariff. 44 Facing both the threat and
the ultimate imposition of punitive tariffs on March 1, 2004,145 Congress
went back to the drawing board to devise a new legislative scheme to
replace the ETI. Two of the more noteworthy proposals considered in the
House were the Crane-Rangel and Thomas Bills.
III. A SUMMARY OF THE CRANE-RANGEL BILL
In April 2003, Representatives Philip Crane (Republican-Illinois) and
Charles Rangel (Democrat-New York) introduced a bill to replace the ETI
regime. 146 Attempting to capitalize on the prevailing economic climate of
worry over unemployment, the bill was aptly titled the "Job Protection Act
of 2003.,,147 The overall purpose of the legislation is to reduce the
corporate tax rate for domestic manufacturers.1 48 The Crane-Rangel Bill is
similar to the ETI regime in that the corporate taxpayer does not have to
establish a separate entity to become a beneficiary of the program's tax
benefits. 4 9 Also like the ETI regime, the amount of tax benefit under
Crane-Rangel is tied directly to the value of transactions dealing with a
specified category of production property. 50 However, Crane-Rangel does
not impose restrictions on where the domestically-produced property may
be used or consumed.' 5' In addition, there are no restrictions on where

144See Paul Meller, Europeans Seek $4 Billion in Trade Sanctions against U.S., N.Y.

Nov. 18, 2000, at Cl. See also After Success on Steel, EU Warns over US Tax
Breaks, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Dec. 5, 2003 available at 2003 WL 69782232 (reporting that
the European Union set a Mar. 1, 2004 deadline for the United States to comply with
FSC/ETI rulings).
141William Newkirk, Europe Hits U.S. Goods with Tariffs in Tax Spat; EU Demands
End to Export Subsidy, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 2, 2004.
146H.R. 1769, supra note 3. The bill was also introduced by Representatives Donald
Manzullo (Republican-Illinois) and Sander Levin (Democrat-Michigan). For convenience,
when this article refers to a section number of the Crane-Rangel Bill, it is technically
referring to the section number of the Internal Revenue Code that the bill proposes to
change.
147 See id.
148 The expected effect of the Crane-Rangel Bill on a company that has 100% domestic
production is for its 35% tax rate to decrease to 311 2%, resulting in a 31/ 2% deduction. See
Phil Crane and Charles Rangel, Building a Level Playing Fieldfor US. Exporters, at
http://www.taxfoundation.org/frontandcenter-cranerangel.html.
...
See I.R.C. § 943(e), supra note 99.
150H.R. 1769, supra note 3, § 250. See also I.R.C. § 942(a) (setting forth the amount of
tax benefit for exporters under the ETI regime).
151H.R. 1769, supra note 3, § 250. See also I.R.C. § 943(a)(1)(B), supra note 104,
(provides for foreign use or consumption requirements under the ETI regime). Indeed, the
lack of a geographic use or consumption requirement reflects the United States' desire to
TIMES,
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152
inputs for qualifying domestic production property can originate.
Moreover, Crane-Rangel is void of any foreign economic process
requirements; it does not matter whether solicitation,53 advertising or
contracting takes place within the United States or abroad.
The centerpiece of the Crane-Rangel Bill is a tax deduction equal to
10% of a corporation's income from "qualified production activities" for

the tax year. 154 The term "qualified production activities income" is defined
as "the product of: (1) the portion of the modified taxable income of the
taxpayer which is attributable
to domestic production activities, and (2) the
155
domestic/foreign fraction."
The Crane-Rangel Bill would add a new Internal Revenue Code
Section 250(d)(1), which would define "modified taxable income of a
taxpayer attributable to domestic production activities" as equal to
"domestic production gross receipts" less the sum of.156 (i) the cost of goods
allocable to such receipts, 157 and (ii) deductions, expenses, or losses directly
allocable to such receipts.15 1 "Domestic production gross receipts" are only
those receipts from the sale or lease of "qualified production property.
Such property can be: "(A) any tangible personal property, (B) any
computer software, and (C) any films, tapes, records, or similar
reproductions.' 60 In whatever form, "qualified production property" must

avoid the legislation found to be an export contingent subsidy under Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM.
152 H.R. 1769, supra note 3, § 250. See also I.R.C. § 943(a)(1)(C)(2002), supra note 105,
(setting limitations under the ETI regime on the percentage of fair market value that can be
attributable to products originating outside the United States.).
153 H.R. 1769, supra note 3, § 250. See also I.R.C. § 942(b), supra note 106 (setting
forth economic requirements under the ETI regime).
154H.R. 1769, supra note 3, § 250(a). Crane-Rangel provides for a transition where the
FSC/ETI benefit is reduced gradually and the new tax benefit is increased. Under § 250(e),
the FSC/ETI benefit is pegged to the 2001 amount indexed to inflation (adjusted base
amount), and the taxpayer receives 100% of the base amount in 2004 and 2005, 75% thereof
in 2006 and 2007, 50% thereof in 2008, and 0% thereof in 2009 and thereafter. Under §
250(b), the Crane-Rangel tax benefit for domestic manufacturers is also phased-in over a
five-year period: a deduction of up to 1% of "qualified production activities income" in
2006, 2% thereof in 2007, 4% thereof in 2008, 9% thereof in 2009, and 10% thereof in 2010
and thereafter.
'15 Id. § 250(c).
d.
117 Id.
158 Id.
151 Id.

250(d)(1)(A).
250(d)(1)(B)(i).
250(d)(1)(B)(ii).
250(e)(1)(A),(B). In addition, under § 250(e)(2)(A), replacement parts, no matter
where manufactured, are covered under domestic gross production receipts, provided the
parts are for qualifying production property.
160 See H.R. 1769, supranote 3, § 250(f)(1)(A)-(C). Certain types of goods are excluded
under § 250(e)(2) including "consumable property that is sold... by the taxpayer as an
integral part of the provision of services."
156

§
§
§
§
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be manufactured, grown, or produced,
in whole or significant part, by the
16
taxpayer within the United States. 1
The other relevant number in calculating a manufacturer's tax
deduction under Crane-Rangel is the "domestic/foreign fraction," defined in
Section 250(g) of the bill. The numerator consists of the "domestic
production value,"'' 62 and the denominator the "value of worldwide
production.' 63 "Domestic production value" is equal to the value of
domestic production gross receipts less the costs of the "purchased inputs"
allocable to such receipts.' 64 Worldwide Production is simply the same
formula with the inclusion
65 of international gross production receipts and the
costs allocable to them. 1

The domestic/foreign fraction works to affect a manufacturer's
decision where to produce and market goods. By multiplying this fraction
with domestic production gross receipts, Crane-Rangel effectively
discounts the amount of income eligible for deduction by a factor
proportionate to the amount of overseas production. Theoretically, the
Crane-Rangel Bill would induce a manufacturer to increase export activity
where the marginal benefit of the tax deduction is greater than the marginal
costs of manufacturing domestically-including increased shipping,
operating, and labor costs.
IV. A SUMMARY OF THE THOMAS BILL
In July 2003, Representative Bill Thomas, chairman of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, introduced a competing bill to replace the ETI tax
regime. 66 Originally introduced in July of 2003, the Thomas Bill has since
undergone several rounds of revisions,167 culminating in the passage of the
161 Id. § 250(e). One question that arises from this definition is the level of activity within
the United States that would satisfy the "significant part" threshold.
162 Id. § 250(g)(1)(A).
163 Id. § 250(g)(1)(B).
164 Id. § 250(g)(2),(3). Purchased Inputs include: "(i) services used in manufacture or
production activities, (ii) items consumed in connection with such activities, (iii) items
incorporate as part of the property being manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted."
161 Id. § 250(g)(4). Crane-Rangel § 250(g)(5) provides that if a taxpayer is part of
an
affiliated group, the domestic/foreign fraction shall be calculated by treating all the members
of such group as a single corporation.
166 H.R. 4520.EH, 108 Cong. (2004). The first version of the Thomas Bill was introduced
as the American Jobs Creation Act of 2003, H.R. 2896.IH 108 Cong. (2003).
167 A significant provision contained in the first version of the Thomas Bill, but
subsequently dropped, pertained to the repeal of CFC rules on "foreign base" income within
subpart F. H.R. 4520.EH § 1101, 108 Cong. (2004). A major source of contention among
multinational corporations has been the calculation of "foreign base income," which includes
"foreign sales income" and "foreign services income." These were designed to prevent
corporations from moving income from one jurisdiction to another for the sole purpose of
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American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 by the House on June 17, 2004.168
Overall, the Thomas Bill takes a significantly different approach
towards replacing the ETI regime. 169 Whereas Crane-Rangel's benefits
were directed solely towards manufacturers that produce their goods
entirely within the United States, the Thomas Bill offers benefits to a much
broader range of corporations, most notably multinationals with significant
manufacturing and services operations overseas. Unlike the FSC and DISC
regimes, the Thomas Bill does not require a taxpayer to formally elect a
special status in order to receive the bill's tax benefits. Instead, much of the
Thomas Bill's reforms are implemented by directly affecting the extant
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Since its passage, the Thomas Bill has achieved much notorietyunfortunately for the wrong reasons. Commentary concerning the more
substantive and far-reaching provisions of the legislation has been
overshadowed by criticism and even ridicule over the litany of special
interest provisions contained in the bill. 70 These special interest provisions
include subsidies for alcohol fuels,' 71 repeal of excise taxes on fishing
tackle boxes, 172 simplification of excise taxes on bows and arrows,' 7 3 and
benefits for manufacturers of SONAR devices used for finding fish. 17 4 The
pork-laden controversy of the Thomas Bill notwithstanding, the following
discussion focuses instead on the broader measures of the Thomas Bill that
taking advantage of a lower-tax jurisdiction. For example, a U.S. manufacturer sells goods
to a foreign buyer. Prior to "foreign sales income," that manufacturer could set up a passthrough entity in a low-tax third jurisdiction in order to have taxes on profits assessed there.
Under the "foreign sales income," the entire income previously allocated to the third nation
was counted as income in the United States, unless the property considered was
manufactured in that third jurisdiction. Section 1101 of the first version of the Thomas Bill
repeals the addition of "foreign services income" and "foreign sales income" to domestic
source income for the U.S. corporate taxpayer.
168 H.R. 4520.EH, 108th Cong. (2004). As will be discussed infra, much of the impetus
behind revising the Thomas Bill has been the addition of special interest provisions. One of
the key Congressmen who ultimately co-sponsored the Thomas Bill was Representative
Crane himself.
169 The Thomas Bill contains a wide variety of provisions, including ones that address
issues other than those posed by the FSC/ETI dispute. Some other key provisions include:
See H.R. 4520.EH, supra note 166, §§ 611-21 (increasing penalties with respect to tax
shelters); id §§ 601-606 (explaining additional measures to reduce corporation expatriation);
id. §§ 221-31 (revising rules for S corporations); id. § 402 (extending tax credits for research
and development); id. § 701-25 (proposing market reform for tobacco growers).
170 See, e.g., William Newkirk, Omnibus Tax Bill Indulges Lobbyists, Eager Shredding of
Tax Code by Lawmakers is Boon for NA SCAR, General Electric Co. and Tobacco Farmers,
CHI. TRIB., July 21, 2004, at C 1.
171H.R. 4520.EH, supranote 166, § 252.
172Id.

§ 290.

' Id. § 289.
174 Id. § 291.
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175
are most relevant to the FSC/ETI dispute.

A. General Tax Relief for Small Corporations
The Thomas Bill reduces the tax burden of small corporations through
a gradual reduction of marginal tax rates beginning in 2005. By 2012,
corporations with $20 million or under in taxable income will be taxed at a
maximum marginal rate of 32%, 176 compared to the present 35% top
marginal rate. 177 To offset some of the revenue lost from this reduction,
higher income corporations, specifically those with taxable income in
excess of $20 million (or $15 million for taxable years until 2012) have
their tax liability increased by the lesser of (a) 3% of taxable income in
excess of aforementioned thresholds, or (b) $610,250 (or $100,000 for the
taxable years until 2012).178
B. Tax Relief for Domestic Production Activities Income
The Thomas Bill reduces and limits the tax burden of companies that
derive income from "Qualified Domestic Production Activities.' 7 9 If a
corporation has any taxable income from these Qualified Production
Activities for the taxable year, then its tax shall not exceed the sum of (i)
the tax on the portion of total income not derived from Qualified Production
Activities, and (ii) 32% (or 34% for taxable years before 2007) on
"Qualified Production Activities Income" (or taxable income if it is less).
Qualified Production Activities Income is defined as the company's
"Domestic Gross Production Receipts" less the costs of selling the goods
allocable to these receipts. 180 Domestic Gross Production Receipts, in turn,
means proceeds from the disposition of "Qualifying Production Property"
that is manufactured "in whole or in significant part.. . within the United
States."' 18' The definition of Qualifying Production Property is quite broad
as it includes all tangible personal property, computer software and sound
175 The Senate amended the Thomas Bill following its passage by the House and as a
result many of the special interest provisions have been stricken from the legislation. This
development offers at least some indication that removing the same type of provisions from
the final joint bill will be a focus of the conference committee.
176 H.R. 4520.EH, supra note 166, § 103(a) (creating a new I.R.C. § 1 I(b)(2)).
17I.R.C. § II(b)(1).
178 H.R. 4520.EH, supra note 166, § 103(a) (creating a new I.R.C. § 11(b)(5)(B)).

179 Id. § 102. Interestingly, domestic production-specific tax relief was not present in the
2003 version of the Thomas Bill. The notion of tax relief based on domestic production is
derived from the Crane-Rangel Bill. Without much doubt, these provisions were a
concession to gain the support of Congressman Crane and other Congressmen previously
aligned with his bill.
180 H.R. 4520.EH, supra note 166, § 102(a).
181Id. In addition, "domestic gross production receipts" include any construction or
architectural services performed in the United States for projects within the United States.
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recordings.
C.

AMT Relief

Generally, the AMT works to prevent a corporation that derives a
significant portion of its profits abroad from paying little or no U.S. income
tax. 182 If a company is subject to AMT, the Internal Revenue Code assesses
a tax in addition to any regular income tax.1 8 3 The Thomas Bill raises the
income threshold above which corporations are required to pay AMT from
$7.5 million to $20 million in average gross receipts for the past three
taxable years. 184
Furthermore, the Thomas Bill eliminates the 90%
limitation on the use of operating losses and foreign tax credits against the
AMT. 185 The motivation behind these reforms appears to be the creation of
greater investment incentives for multinationals that derive a significant
portion of their revenues abroad, regardless of whether those revenues are
reinvested abroad or repatriated back to the United States.
1 86

D. Deduction for Dividends from Foreign Controlled Corporations

To allow foreign controlled corporations to distribute foreign earnings
back to their U.S. corporate shareholders, and to promote investment of
foreign earnings in the United States, the Thomas Bill offers corporate
taxpayers a one-time election to receive a deduction of up to 85% for

182 The AMT provisions are found in I.R.C. §§ 55-59. See Tax Foundation, "Eliminating
the AMT's Limitation on the Use of Foreign Tax Credits," at http://www.taxfoundation.org/
intemationaltax/amtandforeigntaxcredit.html. See also Terrence R. Chorvat & Michael S.
Knoll, The Casefor Repealing the CorporateAlternative Minimum Tax, 56 SMU L. REV.
305 (2003). The AMT was enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, in large part because of
reports that certain large corporations, such as General Electric, were paying relatively little
tax despite high levels of profits.
183Chorvat & Knoll, supra note 182, at 309.
184 H.R. 4520.EH, supra note 166, § 242(a). This provision expands coverage of the
small business exemption from the AMT under I.R.C. § 55(e)(1). Interestingly, the Thomas
Bill still preserves the original and comparatively very low $5 million threshold if the small
business exemption test involves examining the corporation's first three-year period, or some
portion thereof.
185 Id. § 241. Specifically, this is done by striking out I.R.C. § 59(a)(2), which limits the
AMT foreign tax credit to the excess of the pre-credit tentative minimum tax for the year
over ten percent of the amount which would be the pre-credit tentative minimum tax
irrespective of the AMT operating loss deductions.
186 Other subpart F reforms include § 307 (U.S. property not to include certain assets of
controlled foreign corporations (CFCs)), § 309 (repeal of withholding tax on dividends from
certain foreign corporations), § 312 (look through treatment of sale of partnership interests),
§ 313 (repeal of foreign personal holding company and foreign investment company rules), §
315 (repeal of foreign base shipping income regarding aircraft leasing and shipping income),
and § 316 (additional exceptions for active financing under subpart F). H.R. 4520.EH, supra
note 166.
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dividends distributed during the first six-month period of the taxable
year. 187 The deduction must not exceed the greatest of (i) $500 million; (ii)
the amount of earnings permanently reinvested outside of the United States
as shown in a certain financial report; or (iii) an amount prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury. 188 The dividends that are distributed from the
controlled foreign corporation back to the U.S. shareholder must be
reinvested in the United States pursuant to a plan approved by the chief
executive officer and the Board of Directors of the U.S. shareholder
89 that
describes the expenditures to be made from these dividend proceeds.1
E. Reduction of Foreign Tax Credit Baskets
To limit the extent to which foreign source income can be combined so
as to maximize the amount of foreign tax credit, corporate taxpayers are
permitted to combine foreign source income only within nine separate
foreign tax credit baskets.19- The Thomas Bill, however, rearranges and
reduces foreign tax credit baskets from nine to two: "Passive Category
Income" and "General Category Income."' 9 1 General Category Income is
defined as all income other than Passive Category Income.192 Passive
Category Income is defined as passive income and "Specified Category

187 H.R. 4520.EH, supra note
188 Id.
189 Id.
190

166, § 27 1(a) (adding a new I.R.C. § 965 within subpart F).

The current nine foreign source income baskets are: (1) passive income; (2) high

withholding tax interest; (3) financial services income; (4) shipping income; (5) dividends
from each non-controlled I.R.C. § 902 corporation; (6) dividends from a DISC or former
DISC; (7) taxable income attributable to foreign trade income; (8) certain FSC distributions;
and (9) all other income. I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(A)-(I). The Tax Foundation offers an example of
how absent these credit baskets, a corporate taxpayer could behave strategically in order to
maximize the tax credit by "cross-crediting:"
For instance, two items of foreign source income, each equal to $100. The first is taxed
abroad at a 10% rate and the second at a 45% rate, in a year in which the U.S. tax rate is
35%. If we were to apply the foreign tax credit limit to each foreign source separately, the
first item would have a U.S. tax of S35, less a foreign tax credit of $10, resulting in $25
payable to the U.S. government. Similarly, the second item would have a U.S. tax of $35,
with a foreign tax credit of $45, resulting in no payment to the U.S. government because the
foreign tax credit is limited to the amount of U.S. tax. However if the corporate taxpayer was
allowed to combine the two sources of income together so as to create a single income item
of $200, the U.S. tax would be $70, less a foreign tax credit of $55, and as a result, only $15
would be owed the U.S. government.

Tax Foundation, "Reducing the Number of Foreign Tax Credit
http://www.taxfoundation.org/intemationaltax/reducingtaxcredit.html.
191H.R. 4520.EH, supra note 166, at § 303(a).
192 Id. § 303(b).

'Baskets,"

at

Northwestern Journal of

International Law & Business

25:415 (2005)

Passive Income."' 193 Specified Category Passive Income is defined as: "(I)
dividends from a DISC or former DISC... to the extent such dividends are
treated as income from sources without the United States, (II) taxable
income attributable to foreign trade income.., and (III) distributions from
an FSC (or former FSC) out of earnings and profits attributable to foreign
trade income ...or interest or carrying charges."' 94 The anticipated effect
of lowering the number of foreign credit baskets is two-fold. As illustrated
above, fewer baskets enable corporations to combine more of their foreign
source income together in order to achieve greater foreign tax credit
amounts and reduced U.S. tax liability. Second, the reduction of baskets
should also reduce the costs associated with calculating a taxpayer's foreign
tax credit in general, especially among large multinational corporations.
F. Interest Expense Allocation Rules Reform
Another area of the Internal Revenue Code that the Thomas Bill
addresses is interest expense allocation. 195 Currently, the interest expense
of an affiliated group of corporations is allocated between foreign and
domestic sources based on the location of assets. 196 A problem occurs,
however, when the same rules allocate U.S. interest expense to foreign
source income, which in turn lowers the amount of foreign tax credit
available for the affiliated group. 19 7 Corporations and trade industry groups
98
have complained that this method of allocation is imprecise and flawed.
In effect, and to the extent that a foreign tax credit is unavailable, an
additional "double-tax" is levied on a certain percentage of foreign source
income that cannot be offset by foreign tax credits.i 99 As a result, the
Internal Revenue
Code actually creates a disincentive to invest in the
200
United States.

193
194

Id.
Id. at § 303(c).

195 See

Reforming

Interest

Expense

Allocation

Rules,

Tax

Foundation,

at

http://www.taxfoundation.org/intemationaltax/interestallocationrules.html (last visited Mar.
2, 2004).
196 I.R.C. § 864(e)(1) states that "the taxable income of each member of an affiliated
group shall be determined by allocating and apportioning interest expense of each member
as if all members of such group were a single corporation." The actual apportionment
formulae for allocating interest expense are supplied by Treas. Reg. §§ 1.163-8 to 1.163-12.
197

d.

198 See, e.g., Letter from the Securities Industry Association to Congressman Bill
Thomas, supporting H.R. 4520 (June 8, 2004), available at http://www.sia.com/
2004 commentletters/ 1524.pdf.
199 See Kenneth A. Froot & James R. Hines, Jr., Interest Allocation Rules, Financing
Patterns, and the Operations of U.S. Multinationals, in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 277, 279-281. (Martin Feldstein, et al. eds., 1995).
200 See H.R. REP. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 183-84 (2004).
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The Thomas Bill creates a new Section 864(f)(1)(A) which allows a
corporate taxpayer to make a one-time election20° as a "Worldwide
Affiliated Group" and subject itself to a different set of interest allocation
rules.2 °2 A new Section 864(f)(1)(B) sets forth new rules for allocating
interest if a taxpayer makes such an election. 0 3 Specifically, the allocation
of total interest expense of a Worldwide Affiliated Group allocable to
foreign source income of domestic members is equal to the excess of (i) the
interest expense of the Worldwide Affiliated Group multiplied by the
percentage of total assets represented by foreign assets, over (ii) the interest
expense of all foreign members "to the extent such interest expense of such
foreign [members] would have been allocated and apportioned to foreign
source income if this subsection were applied to a group consisting of all
the foreign [members] in such [W]orldwide [A]ffiliated [G]roup. ' 2°
V. THE THOMAS BILL UNDER WTO LEGAL STANDARDS
Based on the decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in the
FSC and ETI cases, it would be difficult for the United States to argue that
none of the Thomas Bill's provisions excludes income that would otherwise
be due under Article 1.1 of the SCM. 20 5 Once again, the broad reach of
I.R.C. Section 61 imposes a nearly insurmountable obstacle for the United
States to overcome given the high threshold set forth by the WTO Appellate
Body.
The United States could, however, raise an interesting argument with

201

H.R. 4520.EH § 301(a), under which § 864(f)(5)(D) would require the domestic

parent of the group to make the election for the first taxable year after December 31, 2008.
The election would continue to apply to all subsequent taxable years.
202 H.R. 4520.EH § 301(a), under which § 864(f)(1)(A) would provide that "[tihe taxable
income of each domestic corporation which is a member of a worldwide affiliated group
shall be determined by allocating and apportioning interest expense of each member as if all
members of such group were a single corporation." (emphasis added). Generally, new §
864(f)(1)(C) defines a Worldwide Affiliated Group, which includes an Affiliated Group, set
forth under I.R.C. § 1504, along with affiliated controlled foreign corporations that meet
certain ownership requirements.
203 Id.
204
205

Id. § 30 1(a), under which § 864(f)(1)(B)(ii) would be amended.
Indeed, it matters little whether a Dispute Panel would use the "prevailing standard"

test used by the FSC Appellate Body, supra note 86, 91, or the "comparable income" test
adopted by the ETI Appellate Body, supra note 131, 91. Not only would a WTO Dispute
Panel find the Thomas Bill to exclude foreign sources of income otherwise due, but it would
also likely find that it excludes domestic sources of income as well (such as the bill's tax
relief for domestic production activities). In that case, there would not likely be a specific
universe that would be analyzed under SCM Article 1.1. Because the Thomas Bill consists of
several independent sets of provisions, it would be highly unlikely that all of it would be
struck down by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Rather, it is more plausible for a WTO
Panel to view the bill as several legislative programs under its umbrella.
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respect to the bill's foreign credit basket reduction and interest allocation
provisions. Although the foreign credit basket reduction would in effect
lead to lost revenue that would otherwise have been collected by the I.R.S.
absent the provisions in question, the context under which this exclusion is
effected is distinguishable from the direct exclusions granted by the FSC
and ETI schemes. Instead, the foreign tax credit basket reduction represents
a change in how foreign tax credits are calculated, and the extent to which
they can be used to offset foreign source income. The additional income
excluded as a result of the basket reduction was conceptually never due in
the first place, since it is generally the policy of the I.R.C. to provide
foreign tax credits for foreign taxes paid in order to avoid double-taxation
of the same income. The creation of different foreign tax credit baskets was
done in order to prevent abuse and limit the extent to which foreign taxes
paid on active foreign source income could be credited towards foreign
taxes paid on passive foreign source income. Moreover, a finding that the
foreign basket reduction provisions do not constitute a subsidy would not
present the slippery slope problem that appeared to concern the FSC
Dispute Panel if nations were free to categorize income and then in turn
argue that any newly excluded income from a legislative scheme was never
otherwise due as a result of that categorization. 296 The universe of income
that is used in determining the amount of foreign tax credit available does
not expand, i.e., there are no new sources of income that are incorporated in
this analysis that would result in a gaping loophole for nations to
circumvent Article 1.1.207
The United States can also defend the Thomas Bill's interest allocation
provisions on similar grounds. It is apparent that the ETI Appellate Body
opened some leeway for nations to define on their own what foreign source
income means, provided that such a definition remained within the bounds
of general prevailing and widely-accepted standards such as the Model
OECD Tax Convention.2 °8 Implicit in this argument is that nations also
possess some degree of flexibility to determine their own rules on what
constitutes an allowable deduction to foreign source income, provided they
fall within similarly reasonable constraints. The United States has a
colorable argument that the interest allocation provisions, specifically how
they allocate between foreign and domestic sources of income, are not only
reasonable, but that they represent a significant improvement over the

206 FSC Panel, supra note 43,

4.1064.
207 Moreover, the character of the income used in determining the foreign tax credit is
still foreign source income as defined by such general standards as the OECD Model Tax
Convention.
208 ETI Appellate Body, supra note 131,
139. The context in which this point arose was
in relation to the double-taxation defense that the United States tried to assert using footnote

59.
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previous rules in that they better reflect the economic reality of what are
real expenses and decreases in wealth on the domestic taxpayer that earns
income abroad. Any additional tax benefit or deduction provided under
these rules, therefore, is meant to further the interest of preventing the
collection of tax revenue, and taxation of any underlying income not meant
to be taxed (and therefore not otherwise due) is a result of any
imperfections in the existing interest allocation rules.2 °9
Ultimately the success of the above arguments would hinge on
whether the WTO Dispute Panel takes a conceptual approach or mechanical
approach in determining what "otherwise due" means. The latter would
simply observe that under the Thomas Bill, income that was previously
taxed and collected by the United States is now excluded. Based on the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body's previous rulings in the FSC and ETI
dispute and their mechanical application of Article 1.1, there is a significant
likelihood that the above provisions of the Thomas Bill would be declared
subsidies.
The above analysis notwithstanding, a subsidy is not illegal unless it is
specifically proscribed by another provision of the SCM, which for the
purposes of this article would fall under Articles 3.1(a) and 3. 1(b). The
question of whether any part of the Thomas Bill represents a subsidy
''contingent upon export performance" would likely call for an examination
of the domestic production activities provisions. Nothing in these
provisions, however, explicitly conditions tax benefit on where the articles
are sold, used, or consumed. Nor can it be directly implied from the
express terms of the domestic production activities provisions that there is
Indeed, both the
invariably a requirement of export performance.

209

Admittedly, such an interpretation of "otherwise due" with respect to the foreign

credit basket and interest allocation provisions would emasculate much of the doubletaxation defense under footnote 59, discussed infra. That is, where relevant, a nation could
simply argue that the income was never otherwise due, and thus the measures in question
would never need to be examined under footnote 59 as it would never be a subsidy in the
first place. This line of reasoning assumes that footnote 59 essentially concedes a subsidy
but then exempts that subsidy on grounds of prevention of double-taxation. The WTO
Dispute Settlement Body would be well-served to provide further clarification on these
matters of law.
210 To be sure, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has not specified how far export
contingency "in fact" should be construed. As discussed supra, export contingency in fact
can be found by implication directly from the express terms of the legislation. Yet, the FSC
and ETI disputes do not answer the question of whether legislation can be found export
contingent in fact based on its empirical effects. In the Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute,
the Dispute Panel provided some clarification:
This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without
having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or
anticipated exportation or export earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to
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Thomas and Crane-Rangel Bills appear to heed the advice of the ETI
Dispute Panel by extending tax benefits to domestic manufacturers
categorically, regardless of whether the goods they produce are consumed
in the United States or abroad. 211 Because the Thomas Bill follows the
explicit instruction of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on how to cure an
otherwise export contingent subsidy, the Thomas Bill would likely escape
an adverse finding against its domestic production tax relief provisions
under Article 3.1 (a).
Even if the foreign credit basket reduction and interest allocation
provisions are declared subsidies by a Dispute Panel, the United States can
present a persuasive and ultimately convincing argument that they do not
constitute subsidies contingent upon export performance because they are
specifically exempted by footnote 59 of Annex I as permissible measures
designed to prevent double-taxation. As previously discussed, the foreign
tax credit basket reduction provisions benefit a taxpayer only to the extent
that it pays taxes to foreign jurisdictions, and by definition only foreign
source income is subject to such taxation.2 12 The interest expense allocation
provisions would raise the more difficult question of whether they are
adequately isolated to offset only foreign source income. In the ETI
dispute, the Appellate Body opined that the provisions in question need not
be entirel' exact in the implementation of its double-taxation prevention
measures.
Yet at the same time, it required such measures to be
reasonably proximate to some general and widely-accepted convention of
foreign source income.214 The question then becomes essentially whether
the interest expense allocation rules work to offset an appropriate universe
of income (i.e., income that would likely be subject to foreign taxation).
Section 301 of the Thomas Bill enables domestic members of a worldwide
affiliated group to offset against foreign source income interest expense of
an amount determined generally by a formula that captures the difference
between (i) the proportion of interest expense allocable to foreign assets,
and (ii) the interest expense of foreign corporations within the Worldwide
Affiliated Group. This difference appears to be a rough, but reasonably
accurate, approximation of the amount of interest expense that should offset
enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be considered to be an export subsidy
within the meaning of this provision.

Subsidies on Upland Cotton Dispute, WT/DS267/R (WTO) (2004), 7.699 n.4., availableat
2004 WL 2075353.
211 See ETI Panel, supra note 108.
212 As one point of reference, the foreign credit basket reduction provisions comport to
the OECD Model Tax Convention, which the ETI Dispute Panel alluded to as a persuasive
source of a definition of foreign source income. See supra note 108.
213 ETI Appellate Body, supra note 131, 139.
214 Id.
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the category of income that runs the greatest risk of double-taxation. The
use of location of assets to approximate the amount of interest expense that
is deductible against foreign source income can admittedly be subject to
inaccuracies. Whether the formula ultimately works precisely enough to
provide the proper types of investment incentives for multinationals is a
question separate and distinct from the compliance issue. Unfortunately,
neither the ETI Panel nor Appellate Body gave any concrete guidance on
how much imprecision is allowable under footnote 59 in order to be within
its ambit. Needless to say, there will be some uncertainty though these
provisions appear to be a significant improvement over those that the
United States tried to defend during the ETI dispute.
The question of whether the domestic production activities provisions
of the Thomas Bill would violate Article 3.1 (b) cannot be answered by
using precedent from the FSC and ETI disputes because the Dispute
Settlement Body declined to rule when it already found violations of Article
3.1(a). Article 3.1(b) of the SCM states, "subsidies contingent, whether
solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over
imported goods [are prohibited]. 2 15
The domestic production activities provisions do not explicitly require
that property be composed of a minimum percentage of domestic inputs (in
contrast to the 50% domestic production requirement imposed by the ETI
regime); it only requires that the goods themselves be manufactured or
produced within the United States. The use of the word "goods" in Article
3.1(b) implies that the provisions cannot be assailed on grounds that it
expresses a preference for domestic services, e.g. labor, over foreign ones,
which would include manufacturing. The question then becomes whether it
is logically deducible that domestic inputs are given preference. Based on
the language of Article 3.1 (b) itself, such a conclusion does not necessarily
follow without introducing empirical evidence that has been or is currently
the result. The introduction of such evidence, however, would shift the
analysis to whether an import subsidy exists de facto. The language of
Article 3.1 (b) is silent on whether a subsidy can be contingent in law or in
fact. However, it is probative and likely persuasive to a Dispute Panel that
the clause immediately before it, Article 3.1(a), explicitly states that a
subsidy can exist whether it is "contingent, in law or in fact." 216 If the
drafters had meant the same to apply to 3.1(b), it would have likely done
so.217

SCM, supra note 46, art. 3.1(b).
Id. at art. 3.1(a) (emphasis added).
217 The Crane-Rangel Bill provided an additional wrinkle, the domestic/foreign fraction,
which adjusted the taxpayer's benefit upward or downward depending on the proportion of
domestic production to overall production. Therefore, where two corporations have different
levels of domestic production, it is possible that the corporation with higher domestic
215

216
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VI. CONCLUSION
Unlike predecessor legislative schemes, the Thomas Bill adopts a
broad, multifaceted approach towards resolving the long-running dispute
with the European Union over export subsidies. It attempts to reform parts
of the existing Internal Revenue Code, particularly those pertaining to
foreign tax credits and interest expense, while at the same time providing
direct subsidies to a segment of corporate taxpayers that have received
heightened attention in the prevailing economic climate. The Crane-Rangel
Bill, on the other hand, focuses exclusively on subsidizing domestic
manufacturers' activities. This dichotomy is reminiscent of what gave rise
to the DISC in the first place. Today, these issues have come full circle,
and Congress once again stands at the same crossroads as it did 1971.
At least with respect to WTO compliance, Part IV of this article
concludes that the Thomas Bill would likely be found to be within the
bounds of SCM. 218 Yet, the ultimate success of the Thomas Bill (or
successor legislation passed by Congress) will hinge on whether it achieves
two main policy objectives: (1) tax reform to remove distortions caused by
the Internal Revenue Code, and (2) revitalization, or at least increased
competitiveness, of domestic manufacturers. To the drafters' credit, the
Thomas Bill breaks through the mold of predecessor regimes and
recognizes that distortions caused by the Internal Revenue Code can be, and
should be, addressed by reforming the Code itself, rather than introducing
new direct subsidies that benefit only a narrow, though powerful, segment
of the United States corporate taxpayer base. 219 Today, it is not only U.S.
manufacturers that face intense global competition; other U.S. corporations
that sell and operate abroad experience similar competitive pressures. It is
therefore doubtful that Crane-Rangel alone would significantly shift
investment activity back to the United States or make U.S. companies in
production would receive less favorable tax treatment, ceteris paribus, than the lower
domestic production taxpayer.
218 Unlike the DISC, FSC, ETI and the Crane-Rangel Bill, the Thomas Bill cannot be
described as a single legislative program with interdependent components. This unique
feature provides the United States, and more importantly corporate taxpayers, with some
measure of risk diversification against having all the tax benefits repealed by a WTO Dispute
Panel. Some provisions, such as general tax relief for small businesses and dividend
received deductions from controlled foreign corporations, are likely to stay intact, even if
some of the more controversial provisions are challenged by other nations. Stability, if not
usually a desired policy interest, takes even greater importance considering the legislative
turnover that has occurred in this area the past three decades.
219 Reforming the idiosyncratic provisions of the Internal Revenue Code also reduces the
likelihood of retaliatory action by other nations, as they would not be able to replicate the
exact provisions of the Thomas Bill but could only attempt to replicate its effects. Should a
foreign nation choose to pursue the latter replication strategy, it risks overcompensating for
the Thomas Bill's effects, and in turn subjects itself to either reciprocal action by the United
States or dispute settlement process before the WTO.
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general more competitive abroad, much less provide an appreciable
stimulus to the U.S. economy. Because of its broader coverage, the
Thomas Bill represents a superior approach towards resolving the FSC and
ETI dispute.22 °
Though the Thomas Bill appears to be an improvement over the
Crane-Rangel Bill, there are still broader tax reforms that the Congressional
committee or Congress could pursue in order to further reduce the distorting
effects of some provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, most notably
subpart F. For instance, the Thomas Bill missed the opportunity to reform
foreign base sales and services income rules and corresponding Treasury
regulations, which currently do not sufficiently differentiate between
passive and active income. These provisions effectively treat sales between
foreign affiliates, even on arms-length pricing terms, as taxable dividends
back to the U.S. affiliate.2
For this reason, a change with respect to
foreign base sales and services income would seem to be a broader and
overall better policy to pursue than a one-time temporary windfall for
multinationals to repatriate their earnings at significantly lower tax rates.
Though the latter measure can be defended as an economic stimulus
program, a permanent adjustment in dividend rates would be more likely to
affect the domestic investment behavior of multinationals in the long run.
Therefore the one-time dividend rate reduction appeals more to special
interest influence than to sensible tax policy.
After extenuated negotiations for over a year, the final version of the
Thomas Bill incorporated a significant portion of the Crane-Rangel Bill's
220 Larry Lindsey, former director of the National Economic Council, argues that an

important source of disadvantage for the United States vis-t-vis many E.U. nations is that the
latter employs an indirect, Value-Added Tax (VAT) system with respect to export earnings,
while the former taxes earnings from exports directly via income taxation. Lawrence B.
Lindsey, Editorial, How to Start a Trade War, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2003, at A12. The
importance of this distinction is that under WTO rules, exemption from indirect taxation
(VAT) is not subject to the same scrutiny as exemption from direct income taxation. A
separate Financial Times editorial calls for the WTO to end such differential treatment, as it
has no basis in economic reality, and consistently and significantly disadvantages nations
that choose to adopt a direct taxation system. Ernest Christian & Gary Hufbauer, End This
Damaging Tax and Trade Charade, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at 11. Until the WTO
eliminates this distinction, direct export income tax relief, such as that provided under the
FSC and ETI, will continue to be struck down. Therefore, it becomes necessary for the
United States to look elsewhere to provide tax relief for the same group taxpayers.
221 See
Tax Foundation, Reforming Foreign Base Company Rules, at
http://www.taxfoundation.org/intemationaltaxibasecompanyrules.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2005). See also supra note 167 for an expanded description of how the foreign base sales
and service income provisions work. To be sure, the Thomas Bill does make some progress
in reforming subpart F. The Senate amended version, H.R. 4520.EAS, § 212, increases the
de-minimis limit for exemption from subpart F income to $5 million. The House version,
H.R. 4520.EH, § 313 repeals the rules concerning foreign personal holding company and
foreign investment company rules.
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provisions. Although there are plenty of policy reasons to question the
wisdom of the Crane-Rangel Bill, it is also clear that manufacturing jobs
have become, and continue to be, a major political issue.222 Realistically,
Congress cannot ignore the steady erosion of U.S. manufacturing activity
and employment opportunities. 223 To that end, the Thomas Bill has also
heeded to these very same interests and concerns. This is embodied not
only in the domestic production activities provisions imported from the
Crane Rangel bill, but also in the reduction in tax rates of small businesses,
which should further reduce the burden of some manufacturers. Without
much prior experience to guide us on what the future will hold, it appears
that at least upon first glance the Thomas Bill represents some positive
aspects of legislative compromise: it will achieve broad-based tax reform
while at the same time ensuring that domestic manufacturers retain some
additional benefits apart from those enjoyed by other corporate taxpayers.
Yet, it can certainly be said that the Thomas Bill also reflects some of
the worst of legislative compromise, as is apparent from the litany of
special interest provisions contained in it. 224 These pork provisions serve
no general purpose other than to appease select Congressmen and their
constituents. Whereas one can make sense of general tax relief on
manufacturers in general, lavishing narrow benefits upon bow and arrow
manufacturers, NASCAR track owners, dog racing track owners, major
Hollywood film studios, and ceiling fan manufacturers, does not appeal to
222 See e.g., Daniel J. Mitchell, Heritage Foundation, FSC/ETI Conference Should Not
Waste Opportunity for Real Tax Reform, available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/Taxes/bg1779.cfm (July 15, 2004). Pragmatically, FSC/ETI compliance legislation
that only creates tax reform would not likely survive in either chamber of Congress.
However, there appear to be legitimate concerns about whether manufacturing subsidies are
likely enough to shift the cost differential between foreign and domestic production that it
will affect location decisions at the margin. Moreover, such foregone revenue could be used
to enact broad-based tax relief (either through reduction in tax rates or reform and
simplification of existing provisions) that could be used to further reduce the competitive tax
disadvantage that U.S. corporations face when operating and earning income abroad.
223The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that nearly three million manufacturing jobs
have been lost since 1998, available at http://www.bls.gov (last visited Jan. 5, 2005). Of
course these same statistics do not break out the percentage of job loss attributable to
increased domestic productivity (which reduces the need for labor), as opposed to
globalization (which shifts domestic labor to foreign locations). The Economic Policy
Institute estimates that about 59% of the aggregate manufacturing job loss is explained by
free trade. Josh Bivens, Shifting Blame for Manufacturing Job Loss: Effect of Rising Trade
Deficit Should Not Be Ignored, Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper, at
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfin/briefingpapers-bp149 (Apr. 8, 2004).
224A reason why the Thomas Bill has been such an attractive target for special interests
is that there is a manifest urgency to pass new tax legislation in order to comply with the
WTO ruling. Realizing that the Thomas Bill is likely to be passed, special interests have
capitalized on this opportunity to add their provisions, knowing that the bill will very likely
be enacted soon.
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any broad policy interest. 225 Removing these infirmities will present a
significant and formidable challenge for the Congressional conference
committee in fall 2004. If the final version of the bill offers a pound of
pork for every ounce of sensible policy, then in the larger context the
international tax reforms may not be worth the steep price paid.
The question of how to best provide tax incentives to U.S. exporters
without running afoul of international trade laws has evaded resolution for
over three decades. With the European Union's tariffs against U.S.
exporters rising each month by 1%, and by latest count now at 12%, there is
little doubt that Congress should now have the requisite sense of urgency to
act swiftly towards achieving a long overdue resolution.

225 The need to scale back special interest provisions is especially apparent given the
ninety billion dollar price tag of the myriad of tax breaks provided under the Thomas Bill.
See Newkirk, supra note 170.
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